Jörg Becker: Peace and Communication. The Empirical and Theoretical Relation Between Two Categories in Social Sciences

1. The Problem

The Constitution of the UNESCO of 1945 contains a clear and unqualified statement on the relationship between communication and peace:

> Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be built; [...] For this reason, the states agree to the free exchange of ideas and knowledge and are determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each others lives [...].

This monocausal, one-dimensional perspective that assumes an automatic favorable impact of communication on international peace finds its echo even today in a number of documents concerning international law. Thus, for example, the signatories of the Helsinki accords of August 1st, 1975, declare in the preamble to Basket II, "that increased exchange in the areas of culture and education, dissemination of information and contacts between people" would contribute to strengthening of peace and understanding between people. Similar arguments appear in the so called mass media declaration of the UNESCO (Nov. 28, 1978), notably in Art. III:

> The mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and [...] in countering [...] incitement to war. [...] the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminating ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples (...) thereby promoting […] policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes.

The supposed peace-inducing properties ascribed to communication - and here in particular to the mass media - are generally assumed to exist not only in the realm of international relations, but also appear in the fundamental premises of many psychological, educational and sociological theories. The communicative act *per se* is frequently said to possess the function of awakening mutual understanding, of helping to reduce conflicts, of stimulating social action and even of helping to bring about a state of harmony where previously there were arch conflicts of interest at play. A consistent pursuit of this train of thought might ultimately lead to the demand (as voiced by Jürgen Habermas) that communicative competence be the primary goal of teaching, since that would be a precondition for the peaceful coexistence of individuals, groups and nations.

These ideas are not so much to be criticized because they have been proven faulty by many empirical analyses; nor do they deserve criticism because (as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer pointed out in their *Dialectics of Enlightenment*) they more or less naively wish into being the existence of social and individual conditions that do not and cannot exist in reality. The object of critique must instead be the matter-of-fact acceptance of non-peaceful, violent and, indeed, "overpowering" communication, because of the exceptions which that permits. To paraphrase Adorno and Horkheimer, mutatis mutandis: Because such peace efforts leave the abolition of injustice to the fortuitousness of peaceful communication, they accept, in reality, the very law of a universal violence which they wish to ameliorate. Discussing universal violence and the exceptional characteristics of peaceful communication at this point would precipitate conclusions which must be arrived at through careful and systematic analysis and exemplification; and that, precisely shall be the focal point of this study. To be sure, it would go beyond the scope of this study to analyze all aspects of the inter-relationships between peace and communication, hence, the area of personal and direct communication between individuals and groups shall be omitted. Chart 11.1 on mass media and peace serves to illustrate the most important theoretical points.

Chart 11.1: Mass Media and Peace. A Comparison of Concepts and Results of Communications Research and Peace Research

	Categories	Critical Communication Research	Critical Peace Research
Production of the Mass Media	Control and Disposition	Concentration in the centers; transnational media oligopolies	Structural violence
	Access	Inequitable, vertical, non-reciprocal for peripheries	Structural violence
	Technology	Spin-off from military technology	Military-industrial complex
Ideologies of the Mass Media	Content	Elitism, racism, materialism, sensationalism, conservatism, conformism, authoritarianism, romanticism, fatalism, sexism aggression, individualism	Enemy images, prejudices; psychically manifest/latent structural violence
	Forms	Stereotyping, dream production	
Effects of the Mass Media	Use	Increasing knowledge gap	Class structure, social stratification, marginalization
	Reception	Receptive	Personal-psychic violence
	Effect	Reinforcement, affirmation, desensitizing, everyday colonialization,	Militarization of everyday life
	Function	Individual/societal control	Legitimating the dynamics of armament
History & Future of the Mass Media	Historical change in the relevance of popular reading matter, mass media, telecommunication, ICT	Culture, media, information and informatics industry	Dynamics of armament, militarization, spiral of violence, military-industrial complex

This choice may well result in the objection that communication is being reduced here to its media aspects and that its function strengthening interpersonal and social relationships is not perceived. Such criticism, however serious, can be countered by remarking that the historical

changes in capitalist societies have been assigning an ever-growing influence and importance to media communication, as is evident, for example, in the increasing relevancy of medial socialization; in the ever larger domain of the media industry; and in the present innovation and explosion of media technology.

The first point of discussion must be the ideological aspects of the messages conveyed by the mass media, for it is particularly these aspects which are alluded to in the initially cited documents. If you were to search for empirical data on the representation of peace in the mass media, you would hunt in vain: there are no such analyses, nor does the topic itself appear to be attractive to the media in the first place. As is the case with other concerns of peace research, here, too, the most promising approach to an understanding of peace is to begin with a definition of its opposite: violence. To be sure, empirical analyses of the representation of violence in the mass media, beginning in the 1940s, may well be so numerous as to fill several libraries. Hence, a careful and critical selection of the material is essential. The major body of this empirical literature focuses on representations of manifest, physical, direct and personal violence (to use Johan Galtung's terminology). That is to say, subjects under examination were military violence, homicide, capital crime, assault and battering, physical brutality and aggression.

Nearly all of the analyses agree that the representation of personal violence takes place with a frequency and an intensity that is all out of proportion not only when compared to its existence in reality, but also in comparison to the possible reality inherent in the media. This consensus applies to the empirical quantitative studies - e.g. to the well-known violence profile by George Gerbner[1] - as well as to empirical qualitative analyses such as those produced by the Frankfurt school. Although Frankfurt school analyses of the representation of structural violence in the mass media are of relatively recent origin, their conclusions correspond convincingly to what the previously mentioned studies have said about overemphasis on personal violence, since forms of structural violence are hardly ever an issue in the mass media.[2] In this context, the results of two different studies on two different subject areas shall be discussed: a) advertising for the weapons industry in trade journals and b) crime reporting in the mass media.

In his analysis of advertising for armament and weapons marketing in West German trade journals, Karsten Weihe presents the following persistent pattern: weapons ads tend to evoke associations with old traditions and experience, emphasize implementation of the latest technological know-how, lean heavily on ideologically-charged concepts like partnership and trust, and use sexual symbolism, ultimately zeroing in on superio-rity and a representation of the potential for destruction.[3] There is no point in playing this down by arguing that the dissemination of military trade journals is limited and that their use is restricted to professionals in the field. As a team of authors in a subsequent analysis were able to show[4], this type of advertising in Germany is the tip of an international iceberg.

Similar material is found in French and English trade journals as well as in the Arabic and Spanish editions of the German publications, and all of them are aimed at a new market: the political and military leadership of Third World countries. The question of media effectiveness is

quite easily answered for the advertising in these military trade journals. As probable links between mass and professional media, these trade journals must be intended to stimulate the sale of industrial products; hence, their effectiveness has been much better researched and documented than that of ordinary mass media. Their intensive use by professionals, not to mention their subjective as well as objective importance for the user are as well understood as their actual contribution to the increase in sales.

The second subject area (crime reporting in the mass media) reveals that the representation of "civil violence" in the mass media dovetails with the representation of military violence. Two recent criminological studies of the representation of "civil violence" and crime in the mass media particularly in the pulp magazines simultaneously came to the conclusion that the image of crime disseminated by the mass media is far from realistic: crime is almost always reduced to the individual fates of criminals and victims; structural violence is ignored. Suspects are mainly seen from the perspective of the states' authorities; the criminal conforms to the widely accepted and disseminated stereotypes of criminals; the social phenomena of the so-called abnormal behavior are degraded to (secretly savored) entertainment.[5] The representation of "civil violence" was characterized as a com-plement to "military violence" because together they provide a fairly accurate reflection of "everyday violence" as experienced by the average television viewer. In addition, they have a political function in that they support the existing conditions of organized "non-peace". The ownership of the military means for destruction must be justified either directly by referring to tradition, to technological innovation or superiority, or - subliminally - by using sexual symbolism. By contrast, the individual criminal is made to appear as a person who is "by nature" mean or evil.

Since both forms of representation exclude the problem of structural violence, the violence perpetrated by the state is legitimized (in contrast to the "naturally" bad guy) either in the figure of the police commissioner or within the world of weapons advertising. In scholarly discussion, the question of violence in the mass media has always also been a question about its effect on the viewer/reader. Putting aside for the moment the effect that violence in the media has on children - present research shows that under certain circumstances, the principles of learning by success and/or imitation apply here - the entire controversy on the problem can be reduced to different approaches in methodology and epistemology.

At present, there are essentially two diametrically opposed schools of thought: On the one hand, there is an approach that focuses on the message as part of campaign research; on the other hand, a user oriented approach as part of the "uses-and-gratification" model. The controversy between the two is complicated because both schools are aware of their positivistic as well as their critical variants. For example, while the positivistic content analysis rejects any statement about inference and effect, the critical schools maintains that what media producers expect when they represent violence is already the expression of an effect inherent in the existing society. In contrast, many a critical qualitative analysis claims the existence of certain medial effects without having empirical data to prove them. Similar problems exist for the proponents of the

"uses-and-gratification" theory. One group considers it proof of its assumptions about the effects of mass media when a certain user group confirms its own social or psychological status by selecting specific crime and action features; the other group interprets such selections as proof of the lack of effect of the mass media, because the users merely make their choices in accordance with their own pre-existing socio-psychological situation.

To make matters worse, both the use as well the media oriented theories can serve as alibi for political domination. The user oriented theory can exculpate the media industry of its political responsibility for the production of massive representations violence; the other side is frequently reproached for neglecting the actual violence existing in society: it tends to blame mass media for causing violence that is in fact, caused by certain social conditions. Interestingly enough, Michael Kunczik, who has been the most vocal German proponent of that school of thought which maintains that violence in the mass media has no effect on the actual social behavior of the viewer/reader, Kunczik, then, has recently shown a slight change of heart.[6] But it is not possible to solve the entire problem in this manner. Like the old question of the chicken and the egg, it is useless to pose an either/or question when trying to analyze the causal relationships between representation of violence in the media and its assumed effects. Instead, an approach to that question must begin with a thorough analysis of the society structure as a fertile soil for medial violence. In other words, one will have to ask to what extent medial violence has to be seen as an integral part of media production itself. Thus, communications research as a part of peace research would have to give up its role in the area of social psychology, a role that Dieter Senghaas assigned as recent in his significant study on "Composition problems of Peace Research"[7] in 1972. Instead, one would have to demand (quoting Frieder Naschold) "that especially in communications research, the concept of power must be introduced as a variable"[8].

2. Technology

Calling to mind the history of mass media technology the direct interest of the military in these technological developments is readily apparent. Beginning with the first wireless transmission of words and later, picture, to the transistor, the first generation of computer in the fifties, to the laser beam, satellite technology, fiberglass and finally, to the micro processor - all of these technological intentions were commissioned and developed by the military and tried out and used in military actions and wars. The use of these technologies was often restricted to the military establishment which exercised political, economical and legal control over them for long time, at least long before the general public learned about their existence in one way or another or experienced them in the form of mass media.

Military interest in communications technology dates back to before the time of wireless transmission of news. An optic-mechanical telegraph line between Berlin and Koblenz, for example, was under the jurisdiction of the Prussian Ministry of War. This medium was operative between 1834 and 1852 via sixty two masts, each outfitted with six pairs of wings, a message

containing 30 words could be sent form the Rhine to Berlin in an hour and a half weather conditions permitting. Licensed exclusively to a federal news service, the purpose of this telegraph line was to transmit to the Prussian military as quickly as possible any information about rebellious movements in the rebellious Rhenish provinces during the run-up to the abortive bourgeois revolution of 1848. But the real break through came during World War I, when the wireless telegraph opened up previously unheard-of opportunities for the military.

Until the turn of the century, the German empire had to depend almost exclusively on British sea-bed cables for overseas communication. This dependence became a particularly weak spot in the empire's sovereignty and its radius of action as communication between the empire and its colonies grew in importance, economically as well as military. The British cable trust had made rigorous use of its monopoly on several occasions - thus, for example, during the Boer war, when great Britain provided cable service only for pro British news. To counteract this monopoly, the German colonial administration as well as the military pressed for two countermeasures: installation of a German-made and international system of undersea cables and a world wide, German-owned wireless network. To be sure, the military had every reason to be concerned about being dependent on British cables: within a flow hours of the declaration of war on August 4th, 1914, the British had destroyed the most important German sea-bed cables in the North Sea. Winfried Lerg, a historian who researches into radio, has the following to say on the beginning of World War I:

> There can be no doubt that in August of 1914, the efficiency and performance in the three most important areas of wireless transmission were considerably below international, and especially below British standards: in the era of military telecommunication for the army and navy; in the area of world-wide continental and marine telecommunication; and in the area of communication with the colonies. In all three areas, there had been an atmosphere of experimentation until 1914. […] This attitude changed quickly, however, as soon as World War I began. […] Private use of radio was […] discontinued on the first day of mobilization. All radio installations […] were requisitioned for military use. The licensing authority for such installations was transferred from the federal post office to the Ministry of War.[9]

Although technologically possible, the ideologi-cal use of radio as a means of "psychological warfare", played only a minor role during World War I. The radio was strictly the domain of the military. The German radio industry - AEG, Siemens and Lorenz - existed almost exclusively on contracts for army and navy at that time. As Winfried Lerg explains:

> With the aid of improvements and innovations of the industry […] which finally moved laboratory findings right up to the hard reality of the front lines, radio technology developed into a tactical and strategic weapon. Its significance was equally great for army and navy, for the latter particularly during the submarine war. The aerial war had, in fact, only become possible through the development of wireless message and navigation systems. […] By an

order of the cabinet of July 18th, 1917, the existing Telegraphentruppe [telegraph corps] was named Nachrichtentruppe [news corps, i.e. signal corps] and declared an independent army corps. At the end of the war, 4,381 officers [...] and 185,000 enlisted men of the signal corps returned.[10]

This segment from the history of communications technology is significant for several reasons. It exemplifies a number of constellations that were to repeat themselves or which became the beginnings of historically new power structures. The following points are of particular interest.

- The political, economical, military and even personal dovetailing of the electronics industry and the military during World War I actually marked the modest beginnings of the full-blown military industrial complex that was to develop in the United States after World War I.

- Innovations in communications technology are exclusively geared toward and used by the military; war provides the most favorable conditions for research and testing. World War I was the testing ground for radio technology, and likewise the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 became the testing ground for satellite technology.

- The ideological, content-oriented use of new communications technology is of secondary importance. With variable time lags, it comes into play only after military use has become fully operational.

- It is particularly enlightening to observe the history of the changing function of telecommunications from a tactical instru-ment of war to a public medium of entertainment - the radio. After the war, the former members of the signal corps were looking for jobs. At the same time and more significantly the electro-nics industry had to look for new and promising markets, if it was to survive. Similar development took place in the USA after World War I. Immediately after World War I, for example, the US government still advocated an international frequency regulations policy that would have allowed for pluralism and compatibility in the international radio appliance industry; by the end of the 1920s, however, the US government had drastically changed this direction by pursuing policies that were clearly intended to create a world-wide, exclusive market for North American radio sets. The pressure exerted by the electronics industry (which was, originally, a military one) was aimed at world-wide standardization patterned on North American radio technology with the ultimate goal of penetrating foreign markets with indigenous, that is US, appliances.

The example from World War I could easily be repeated for other communications

technologies and other periods of time. Even without a world war, similar mechanisms for computer and satellite technology obtain today. These technologies, such as telecommunications, are military in nature, too; two thirds of all present day satellites are military satellites for reconnaissance and early warning systems. A few of the high frequency bands are even licensed for military use only. In contrast to this militarization of space, there is a growing demand from Third World countries for civilian use of satellites and frequencies, since satellites would render superfluous in the many extensive areas of Third World countries the much more costly construction of earthbound telecommunications infrastructures. Significantly, a request for demilitarization of the respective high frequencies made by India in 1979, at the World Administrative Radio Conference in Geneva, was rejected by the USSR as well as the USA, against the votes of the entire Third World.

In summary, communications technology must be understood as a byproduct and spin-off of military technology. The greater the significance of communications technology for the national economy, the tighter it is bound to the military industrial complex.

3. Access

As soon as communications technology becomes part of the civilian domain and this applies to hardware as well as software it is no longer enough to explain questions of access to this technology by considering military power structures alone. As the overthrow of Salvador Allende's Government in Chile documented all too clearly[11], its success depended to a decisive degree on the direct, intentional and well coordinated cooperation between the local and the foreign military, the secret services and the electronics as well as the entertainment industry.

All in all, access to civilian communications technology, command of its resources, participation in the decision-making process as to the use of these resources and the position of the peripheries in the flow of information must be recognized as expressions of structural violence. The term structural violence is understood here as a politico-economic system in which the chances for participation in power are extremely unequal, a system in which, using the center-periphery model, the peripheries are subject to directives by the centers in the interest of the latter. Asking the question of access to communications technology and production, the model of structural violence could well be discussed within an international, national or social individual frame of reference. International relationships may serve here as an exemplary case for all with an analysis of the structure of news agencies as important gatekeepers of the press.

The present international system of news reporting is dominated by five news agencies. Only UPI, AP, Reuter's, AFP and TASS operate world-wide and have the organizational technological and economic capacities to fulfill all the functions of a news agency. While these agencies circulate approx. a million words daily, there are many Third World countries that do not even possess a single national news agency of their own. By contrast, a few of the "threshold countries" of the Third World produce only about 10,000 words per day. Heading this communication and

information export are the two North American agencies. For example, approx. 40 percent of all news items in the 14 politically most important and most widely sold Latin American newspapers are bought from UPI, 31 percent from AP. Most of the remainder is divided up by Reuter's and AFP.

Similar surveys with comparable results exist for various time periods and regions. Taking into consideration all necessary individual differences, they all confirm the pattern of a one-sided flow of information, a one-way-street for news agencies leading from the metropolitan centers to the peripheries.

That means in effect, that the filters and criteria for selection of a piece of news are determined by and dependent upon the economic value of that information for the centers - dependent, who had in turn their political interests, socio-cultural distortions and selective patterns of perception. Since this one-way flow of information has been proven to exist in other media, too, the phrase "free exchange of ideas and knowledge" (as quoted initially from the UNESCO document of 1945) can no longer be seen as a statement of fact, but only as a political imperative. If the international flow of information be merely a reflection of actual international power structures, then it follows that this formula of a "free exchange" merely serves to obscure the true nature of these power structures.

A historical survey of the origin of this formula makes it ideolo-gically suspect. As Herbert Schiller has outlined convincingly[12], this formula - this coin - was phrased jointly by US politicians and media corporations in the early forties. At that time this was done not only as part of the resistance against fascism but very soon also as an ideological basis for the massive onslaught of North American media which was to hit Western Europe after 1945. Together with the above mentioned principle of assignment of radio frequencies on a first come first served basis to the technologically most advanced applicant by the International Telecommunication Union, this principle of the free flow of information ensures the dominant position of the metropolitan centers.

In 1975, Fernando Reyes Matta further differentiated the existing studies on the one-way flow of information[13]. As a kind of case study, he carefully analyzed Latin American newspapers during the week following the independence day of the former Dutch colony Surinam. This date - so important for the process of decolonialization - was either completely ignored by the Latin American press, or mention of it (and this is the significant factor) reached the Latin American reader only via the detour of a UPI press release.

Considering this and later analyses, the justifiable conclusion is that the international flow of information not only runs in one direction, but in addition, that it also shapes the structure of the flow of information within the peripheries themselves. Summing up, then, the international structure of the news systems can be characterized as follows:

- The flow of information follows a one-way vertical course from the center to the periphery.
- The centers among themselves exchange information directly and reciprocally.
- The exchange of information between neighboring peripheries functions indirectly, by

means of detours through the respective centers. If the peripheries are part of differing sub-systems, the exchange of information is even more indirect.

- A horizontal exchange of information of the peripheries among each other is minimal.

This structure of the international news system must be seen as nothing short of a "classic" expression of structural violence, for it systematically denies the periphery (and even indeed the peripheries within the periphery!) access to communications production and technology. "Classic" is indeed the proper term to apply to this structure because the unmistakable imbalance of power in favor of the centers automatically makes the peripheries even more dependent on the metropolitan centers for access to the communication media than they are, for example, for access to property ownership, work, capital and raw materials. Thus, the existing international information system and not only that of the news agencies is not merely an expression of structural violence but in addition an essential instrument for the stabilization of this system of violence.

4. The Power of Control

As numerous studies have shown, multinational mixed-media corporations which are part and parcel of the military industrial complex play the key role in the international information order. In other words: the power of control over and distribution of information is closely tied to the very existence of this societal power structure. The structural violence of multinational mixed-media corporations can tolerate sovereign auto-centric and participatory development of the information systems only for very limited periods of time and in a few historical, anachronistic and relative areas of free interplay between the oligopolies; in principle, however, it can only promote a development in dependency as it were.

And we can assume that in the future, a very limited kind of development will take place, not so much in the realm of content but rather in the structural areas. Transnational mixed media corporations are now standing on the threshold of an era of technological development in which content (software) will be of secondary importance, an era in which almost every target group will be adequately supplied with (what the industry deems to be) its very own content.

"Knowledge is power", wrote the English "enlightener" Francis Bacon in his *Essays* of 1598. Such a statement had to remain idealistic and hence ideological as long as an accumulation of power was, indeed not possible through an accumulation of knowledge, but rather, through the material exploitation of labor aimed at accumulating surplus in the era of a society which produced material goods. As long as this material exploitation determined the essential character of a historical stage, it was possible to unmask and personally experience Bacon's message as a fraud. Speaking abstractly: There was still a gap between ideology and social reality. But if, in the light of present day experience, the ideological mainstays "centralism" and "modernism" were to become reality which would seem to be the logical continuation of a seemingly inexorable histor-ical process, then Bacon's words would, indeed, hold true, if applied to the present day and

reformulated to elucidate their inherent dynamics: Know-ledge presupposes social power (a) and at the same time produces it (b) - power presupposes knowledge (c) and at the same time same time produces it (d). The following examples are offered as illustrations:

a. Lockheed's largest database owes its existence entirely to the power constellation of a multinational corporation (the economic basis of knowledge).
b. Technological expertise on how TV satellites functions such as was gained through the Indian SITE experiment is helping the Federal Government of India to consolidate its drive toward becoming a sub-metropolitan superpower (power through knowledge).
c. Only its monopolized lead in computer know-how and information and communication technologies (ICT) enabled IBM as a multi-national corporation to blackmail Indonesia into exempting it from nationalization. (knowledge as a basis for economic power).
d. The power concentration in the metropolitan centers leads (in the centers) to an accumulation of knowledge on the peripheries (knowledge through power).

This spiral of reciprocal dependence between knowledge and power creates its own dynamics of development which seems to be a historic societal necessity. Its course and its goals frequently defy rational analysis, so that - at least on the surface - only the technological auto-dynamics remain visible. But actually, the process of transformations toward a global "post industrial" society is much more complex than that. The scholars of the Enlightenment were still able to formulate their social criticism and protest by comparing ideologies; in the current process of dovetailing knowledge and power, a distinct trend toward the (ab)use of information as a tool for gaining economic and political power is fast gaining ground - ideologies are becoming minor ingredients in the technological power play.

Thus, for example, a single multimedia corporation can market si-multaneously feminist movies, textbooks for a fascist military dictatorship in Latin America, and Marxist professional journals for sociologists. Indeed, the programming costs for the Indian SITE experiment are a mere nine percent of the total budget.

The other side of the coin, the trend toward an "informationalization" of power, becomes especially clear when one considers the political chances of realizing possible counter movements. Since the process of transformation toward the "post-industrial" information society takes place *sub rosa*, there is hardly any directly felt concern as a basis for protest and revolt; a socially relevant citizens' initiative against the computerization of the individual is not likely to take shape. And how, after all, is one to resist effectively the global process of "informationalization", when its protagonists such as the US delegation at the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 in Geneva, for example, can carry out the consolidation of the future computer society only with the aid of computers, when a large part of the data stored on computers consists of data on computer technology?

Besides, as long as almost every socially interest group - political parties, societies, nations - is

as yet convinced that the main objective is to use the given information technology only in their own best interests - be that progressive or conservative, the cause of capitalism or socialism, the interests of the Third World - as long as these conditions obtain, then, the previously described knowledge/power-spiral, the "informationalization", will certainly not undergo any qualitative changes. To be sure, the final report of the McBride Commission to the UNESCO still holds to that idealistic notion; its central message reads as follows:

> The survey contained in this report has recorded a dramatic expansion of communications resources and possibilities. It is an expansion that promises great opportunities, but also raises anxieties and uncertainties. Everything will depend on the use made of the new resources - that is, on crucial decisions, and on the question of who will make the decisions. Communication can be an instrument of power, a revolutionary weapon, a commercial product, or a means of education; it can serve the ends of either liberation or of oppression.[14]

5. Conclusion

Before summing up and returning to the initial question as to the interrelationships between communications, the mass media and peace, it bears stating that I have only cursorily touched on some aspects of this entire complex in the attached Chart (see Chart 11.1). Only brief mention can be made here, for example, of a number of empirical studies conducted in the United States which came to the conclusion that the use of mass media, too, is subject to structural violence. According to these studies, the recent enormous increase in informational programming appears to have the effect of providing those already in the know with still more knowledge, while those who have been kept in the dark before are sinking into ever deeper ignorance. This scissors like movement of the "increasing knowledge gap" seems to reinforce the existing class structure now in the area of information an communication.

Many questions remain unanswered. Is it impossible for example, to provide an answer to the important question whether representations of violence have increased during the 50-year history of the mass media, because empirical time series analyses are practically non-existent. Or another problem: When Joseph Goebbels pronounced his propagandistic credo "We certainly do not want [...] our SA boys marching across the stage or through the movies. They are supposed to march through the streets"[15] - he actually announced policies that assigned to the seemingly apolitical, purely entertaining movies of the fascist ear the function of compensating for the very real every day violence and the later military violence as well. This simultaneous discrepancy between real and mediated violence during that particular time in history - could there be parallels to this phenomenon in other times and cultures? For example, what exactly is the function of the current onslaught of horror and violence in US films since about 1975, that is to say since the end of the Vietnam War?

No matter how carefully differentiated an answer to such questions would have to be, the

initially offered interpretation (which took into consideration Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's *Dialectics of Enlightenment*) appears to be universally applicable at this point in time. If mass-media reception as well as production are both the expression and the engine motor of structural violence; if communications technology can be understood, historically, only as an integral part of the emerging military industrial complex; if indeed, the "law of universal violence" obtains, then the mass media can be considered to fulfill their originally hoped for function as "peace-bringers" under rare and exceptional circumstances. The representation of violence in the mass media, then, is part and parcel of the universal violence of the media themselves.

Communications produced by the mass media have always been an economical as well as an ideological commodity. The well-documented media trend toward the commercialization of production as well as content makes commodities out of the recipients, too; economics is fast becoming the primary concern. Thus, for example, more than 60 percent of the available space in the Latin American publications mentioned above is taken up by advertising and the military trade journals mentioned earlier receive 80 percent of their total income from advertising, which makes them precursors of the many scientific technical trade journals in the USA which are financed completely (100 percent) by advertising. In such journals, an expert author has to pay according to the "page-charge" principle to have a scholarly article printed.

The more advanced the communications technology, so it seems, the higher the degree to which mass media are commercialized. This primacy of economic considerations will continue to strengthen the system of structural violence, because it cannot comprehend the mass media and their content as a social resource for the common good. Only when they open up to a process to democratization on all levels - to the so-called New International Information Order (NIIO) - will the mass media fulfill their function as contributors to a peaceful society. Until such a time, every analysis of "communications and peace" must of necessity turn into an analysis of "communications and the prevention of peace".

Notes and References

1. Gerbner, George and Gross, Larry P.: "Living with television: the Violence profile", in: *Journal of Communication*, 1976, pp. 173-99; Gerbner, George et al.: "TV violence profile no. 8: the high lights", in: *Journal of Communication*, 1977, pp. 1330.

2. Cf. e.g. Glass, Daniel: *Die Dritte Welt in der Presse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Eine ideologiekritische Fallstudie, Frankfurt: Haag & Herchen 1979.

3. Weihe, Karsten: "Rüstungswerbung in der Bundesrepublik", in: *Militärpolitik Dokumentation*, No. 9-10/1978.

4. Weihe, Karsten; Brzoska, Michael; Lock, Peter and Wulf, Herbert: *Advertising and Public Relations in the Arms Industries*: Their Role in the Mass Media, Paris: UNESCO 1980 (Doc. No. 50 of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems).

5. Becker, Peter von: *Straftäter und Tatverdächtige in den Massenmedien*. Die Frage der

Rechtmäßigkeit identifizierender Kriminalberichte. Eine Untersuchung zur beispielhaften Konkretisierung von Medienverantwortung im demokratisch-sozialen Rechtsstaat, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1979; Schneider, Hans Joachim: *Das Geschäft mit dem Verbrechen*. Massenmedien und Kriminalität, Munich: Kindler 1980.

6. Kunczik, Michael: "Gewaltdarstellungen im Fernsehen. Besteht Anlaß zum Umdenken?", in: *Media Perspektiven*, No. 12/1980.

7. Senghaas, Dieter: "Kompositionsprobleme der Friedensforschung", in: *Kritische Friedensforschung*, ed. by Dieter Senghaas, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1972, pp. 313-361.

8. Naschold, Frieder: "Kommunikationstheorien", in: *Gesellschaftliche Kommunikation und Information*. Vol. 1, ed. by Aufermann, Jörg; Bohrmann, Hans and Sülzer, Rolf, Frankfurt: Fischer Athenäum 1973, p. 48.

9. Lerg, Winfried B.: *Rundfunkpolitik in der Weimarer Republik*, Munich: dtv 1980 (= Rundfunk in Deutschland. Vol.1), p. 34.

10. Lerg, Winfried B.: *Die Entstehung des Rundfunks in Deutschland*. Herkunft und Entwicklung eines publizistischen Mittels, Frankfurt: Knecht 1965, p. 43.

11. For more details see Landis, Fred: *Psychological warfare and media operations in Chile 1970-73*, Urbana, III. 1975 (unpubl. Thesis); Freed, Donald and Landis, Fred: *Death in Washington*. The Murder of Orlando Letelier, West Port: Hill 1980.

12. Schiller, Herbert I.: "Genesis of the Free Flow of Information Principles", in: *Communication and class struggle*, ed. by Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub, New York: International General 1979.

13. Reyes Matta, Fernando: "The Information Bedazzlement of Latin America", in: *Development Dialogue*, No. 2/1976, pp. 29-42.

14. *Many Voices, One World*. Report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, Paris: UNESCO 1980, p. 259.

15. Goebbels, Joseph: "Rede in den Tennishallen am 19.5.1933", in: *Nationalsozialistische Filmpolitik*, ed. by Gerd Albrecht, Stuttgart 1969, p. 442.